With the end of the cold war, the international community has found the will and resources to do something about murderous and failed states. Where humanitarian intervention was previously rare and considered illegitimate, the United Nations has sponsored and organized numerous large-scale peace operations since the end of the cold war. This chapter begins by considering the transition from traditional peacekeeping to more ambitious post-cold war peace operations. Here, we focus on the balance between maintaining consent for peace operations whilst also being prepared to use force to neutralize those seeking to wreck peace agreements and oppose the humanitarian mission. We go on to draw a basic distinction between intervention optimists and intervention pessimists. A real policy dilemma divides these views—the desire to do much and the risks of mission failure—which is examined in the context of Somalia and Rwanda. In examining the politics of humanitarian intervention, we look at the impact of public opinion and the role of Security Council politics. We explore the military character of peace operations by first considering the applicability of the main principles of war, and then by looking at how, in practice, peace operations are shaped by political imperatives. In conclusion, the prospects for peace operations look hopeful with a return to intervention optimism in the international community but significant problems remain, especially with regard to underfunding of the United Nations.
Introduction

Humanitarian intervention is directed towards two purposes: providing emergency assistance and protecting fundamental human rights. Strictly speaking, humanitarian intervention can and often does take non-military forms: emergency aid in the form of money, medicine, food, and expertise, and human rights promotion through diplomacy and sanctions. However, usually when reporters and policy-makers speak of humanitarian intervention they mean ‘forcible military intervention in humanitarian crises’. Such intervention is necessary in failed states, when ongoing conflict threatens aid operations, and against murderous states to stop massive human rights abuses. To these ends, the intervening forces may undertake a variety of peace operations aimed at creating security and suppressing conflict.

Humanitarian intervention is a post-cold war activity. During the cold war, it was rare for three reasons. First, the cold war dominated international politics. The great powers focused their military efforts on waging the cold war, building up massive deterrent forces for this purpose. The great powers did intervene in Third World conflicts, but this was for the purpose of supporting one’s own, or undermining the other sides’, client states. Such military intervention served to fuel these proxy wars rather than stop them. The great powers also funded and armed client states engaged in massive human rights atrocities. Second, there was insufficient public pressure for the great powers to do anything to ameliorate Third World conflicts. Eastern and Western publics were indoctrinated into viewing these conflicts and client states as elements of a larger cold war battle, in which human rights could be sacrificed in the interests of national security. Third, cold war politics prevented international collaboration in suppressing Third World conflicts or punishing murderous states, chiefly by paralysing the UN Security Council (UNSC). To be legal, forcible military intervention in a humanitarian crisis must be authorized by a resolution of the Security Council. However, UNSC resolutions can be vetoed by any one of the permanent five members (P5). With the P5 split along the cold war divide—Britain, France, the United States versus the Soviet Union and latterly communist China—each side traded vetoes: 279 in all during the cold war.

The last decade of the twentieth century saw an unprecedented increase in the number and scale of military interventions by United Nations forces: this has been called the new interventionism. Between 1998 and 1993 alone, 20 new peacekeeping missions were established. At the same time, the size of the annual UN peacekeeping budget shot up from US$230 million in 1988, to between US$800 million and US$1.6 billion throughout the 1990s. Behind this increased activity was the end of the cold war, which produced the demand, opportunities, and incentives for UN-sponsored humanitarian intervention. A series of regional peace agreements in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and Cambodia accompanied the winding down of the cold war, and these demanded peacekeeping forces to supervise ceasefires, military demobilization, and elections. The opportunities to respond to this demand existed with increased great power cooperation in the UNSC and with the freeing up of surplus cold war military capability for peacekeeping duties. Incentives for humanitarian intervention have come from public pressure on
Western governments to do something about large-scale civilian suffering in failed and murderous states.

As humanitarian interventions have grown in size and frequency, so they have increased in importance to strategic studies. Traditionally, strategic studies has devoted little attention to such low-intensity conflict, focusing instead on war between major regional powers and the nuclear-armed superpowers. However, given the new interventionism, students and scholars must follow soldiers and statesmen in trying to understand the dynamics of humanitarian intervention.

### From Peacekeeping to Peace Operations

A few military deployments of limited size and scope were authorized by the UNSC during the cold war in the context of traditional peacekeeping. Commonly referred to as ‘Chapter VI-and-a-half’ activity, traditional peacekeeping is seen to lie somewhere between Chapter VI of the UN Charter, ‘Pacific settlement of disputes’ and Chapter VII which provides for use of force by the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. Traditional peacekeeping missions were deployed only when a conflict had ceased and with the consent of the belligerents. They typically served to monitor ceasefires and supervise truces; occasionally, peacekeeping missions were deployed to keep belligerents apart as in Cyprus in 1964. These missions relied on their impartiality and the goodwill of the parties concerned to fulfil their mandate. Accordingly, they were small in size and lightly armed, typically comprising contingents from neutral and non-aligned states. Between 1948 and 1978, 13 such missions were established, with none for the decade thereafter. Only once during the cold war did the United Nations authorize a US-led peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII; in 1950 against North Korea. On another occasion, the UNSC permitted the peacekeeping mission in the Congo (1960–64) to turn into a peace enforcement operation to restore public order and protect the government.

In contrast, the UN humanitarian interventions of the post-cold war era have been much larger, more complex affairs than predecessor missions. These new interventions have involved a much wider range of tasks, including protecting territory, people, and aid operations, disarming belligerents, policing demilitarized sites and monitoring demobilization, monitoring and running elections, and helping to reconstruct governments, police forces, and armies. The British Army initially called these operations ‘wider peacekeeping’. This term not only reflected the wider range of operational tasks involved. It also recognized that such peacekeeping operations occupied a grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Not all aspects of these multitask missions had the full consent of all the parties on the ground. Whereas consent was central to traditional peacekeeping, it was not to the new breed of wider peacekeeping. Peacekeepers had to be able to threaten and to use force to achieve their mandate; if necessary, to force aid through to the starving, to repulse attacks on civilians, to forcibly disarm troublemakers, and to arrest war criminals.
In fact, the British Army’s interim doctrine on *Wider Peacekeeping* (UK Army Field Manual 1995) was designed to caution policy-makers and the public about the costs of using force in peacekeeping (unusually for military doctrine, a glossy version was on sale at bookstores). Critical here is the relationship between consent, force, and impartiality. *Wider Peacekeeping* distinguished between the tactical and operational level of consent for peacekeeping missions. It argued that should consent be withdraw at the tactical level, where one or more belligerent groups obstruct peacekeepers in the field, small amounts of force may be used to keep the mission on track. However, it warned that excessive use of force could result in a collapse of consent for the mission as a whole (i.e., at the operational level). Under such circumstances, the mission would have crossed the ‘consent divide’, undermining its credibility as an impartial peacekeeping force and prejudicing mission legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents. Uncontrolled escalation in violence (including attacks on peacekeepers) was bound to follow.

*Wider Peacekeeping* deliberately painted a bleak picture of what happens when a modest force is given an ambitious mandate. It came at a time when the British Army was being asked to do much in Bosnia with few resources on the ground. This doctrine also reflected the UN operation in Somalia, which took on one of the warring factions and lost (see next section). It certainly resonated with the first British commander of UN force in Bosnia, General Sir Michael Rose, who referred to the consent divide as the ‘Mogadishu Line’. The lesson was clear to General Rose, who later observed:

> “The clear lesson of Somalia and Bosnia is that to confuse the strategic goals of war fighting and peacekeeping, will risk the success of the mission and also the very lives of the peacekeepers and aid worker themselves. A peacekeeping force . . . simply cannot be used to alter the military balance of force in a civil war . . . or even attempt to force the passage of a convoy—for these are pure acts of war.”

Rose (1995: 23)

However, this attitude, reflected in *Wider Peacekeeping*, was unhelpful when peacekeeping missions had no choice but to the consent divide into peace enforcement. *Wider Peacekeeping* rightly warned that this must be a deliberate act of policy, but gave little

### BOX 15.1

**Peacekeepers and Peace Enforcers as Pigs and Parrots**

[Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement cannot be guided by a set of common principles. The peacekeeper to peace-enforcer is as referee to football player. The objectives of each are different. One is there to win, the other to ensure fair play . . . Like pigs and parrots, the differences between peacekeepers and peace-enforcers outweigh their similarities . . . Peacekeeping is depicted as a scaled-down version of peace-enforcement [in US military thinking]. The pig, in effect, is being regarded as small species of parrot . . . [This] can lead to peacekeeping being subject to a set of common principles that impose combatant, adversary-orientated attitudes on the impartial third-party activities that constitute peacekeeping. Pigs are, as it were, being encouraged to fly.]

Colonel Charles Dobbie (1994: 141–142)
advice as to what should happen next. This was because the chief author of *Wider Peacekeeping*, Colonel Charles Dobbie (like General Rose), considered peace enforcement to be synonymous with war, and thus not the business of peacekeepers. In effect, Dobbie saw peacekeepers and peace enforcers as totally different creatures (see Box 15.1).

However, Dobbie’s approach is too passive, for it leaves peacekeepers dependent on the cooperation of the warring parties. Under such circumstances, peacekeeping missions can fall prey to ‘spoilers’—leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’ (Stedman 1997: 5). Where spoilers are identified, peacekeepers must be able to engage in robust and aggressive action to bring them to heel. This option was discouraged by the sharp distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement drawn in *Wider Peacekeeping*. In contrast, the US Army grouped peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the category of peace operations. In its doctrine, *Peace Operations* (Department of the Army 1994), many of the tasks originally viewed as wider peacekeeping by the British, are conceived as peace enforcement by the Americans. These tasks invariably involve coercing belligerents to comply with UNSC resolutions: in short, to use force to induce consent for peace operations. *Peace Operations* advises US commanders as to how combat power can be used to induce consent. The British Army has since moved closer to this position. It now accepts that it must prepare to use force in peace operations, and that impartiality ought to be defined not in relation to the warring parties but to the mission mandate, i.e., force will be used equally against all who threaten the mission.

The importance of being prepared to neutralize peace spoilers and thereby induce consent is well illustrated in the UN intervention in Bosnia (see Box 15.2). From 1992 to 1995, a 7,000 strong force deployed in Bosnia as part of the United Nations Operations in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) attempted to alleviate the suffering of civilians trapped in the midst of a war, waged by Serbia and Croatia (in collusion with their Serb and Croat allies in Bosnia) against the newborn multi-ethnic and democratic Bosnia state. Under General Rose and with the support of the UN Secretariat in New York, UNPROFOR defined its principal mission as helping to deliver aid. Later, it was mandated by the UNSC to watch over six designated ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia. These were enclaves of Muslim civilians surrounded by the Bosnian Serb military. Under Rose, UNPROFOR was not prepared to use force to push aid through road blockades or to protect civilians (including those in so-called ‘safe areas’). During this time, UN policy amounted to a policy of endless appeasement; it relied on the goodwill of Bosnia Serb extremists to let aid through, protect defenceless Muslim civilians, and negotiate a peace. Yet these same Bosnian Serbs were bent on destroying multi-ethnic Bosnian democracy through a campaign of murder and terror against the Muslim population. Certainly, there was a dilemma facing UNPROFOR: calling in air strikes to punish Serb transgression would push it across the consent divide, yet it lacked the land power to defend aid convoys and safe areas against Serb retaliation. However, UNPROFOR’s military weakness was reinforced by a weakness in UN thinking which ruled out a military solution to the Bosnian crisis. For even when UNPROFOR was reinforced by an Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force of helicopter gunships and artillery, the UN Secretariat was reluctant to get tough with Bosnian Serbs. Thus, even when it was militarily equipped to deal with Serb spoilers, it was conceptually ill-equipped to do so. The final straw was the
Overrunning of two safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, and slaughtering of the male civilian inhabitants by Bosnian Serb forces. Rose’s replacement, British General Rupert Smith, decided that it was time to ‘escalate to success’ (Honig 2001: 201). In retaliation for Serbian shelling of Sarajevo (another safe area) in August 1995, he called in NATO airstrikes. This military pressure in combination with military advances by Bosnian government and Bosnia Croat forces in the Eastern Bosnia persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to sue for peace.

**KEY POINTS**

- Limited traditional peacekeeping operations have given way in the post-cold war era to larger, more complex, and more ambitious wider peacekeeping operations.
- Critical to wider peacekeeping is the relationship between consent, force, and impartiality. If a peace force uses too much force it risks losing its impartiality and crossing the consent divide into open conflict. At the same time, a peace force must be prepared to use sufficient force to counter peace spoilers and induce consent for its operation.
- The war dragged on in Bosnia because the United Nations pursued a policy of endless appeasement when it should have used force against Serb spoilers.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that many of the errors the United Nations made [in Bosnia] flowed from a single and no doubt well-intentioned effort: we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep. Knowing that any other course of action would jeopardize the lives of the troops, we tried to create—or imagine—an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping—agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality—could be upheld . . . None of the conditions for the deployment of peacekeepers had been met: there was no peace agreement—not even a functioning ceasefire—there was no clear will to peace and there was no clear consent by the belligerents . . . Nor was the provision of humanitarian aid a sufficient response to ‘ethnic cleansing’ and to an attempted genocide . . . The Bosnia Muslim civilian population thus become the principal victim of brutally aggressive military and paramilitary Serb operations to depopulate coveted territories in order to allow them to be repopulated by Serbs . . . In the end, these Bosnian Serb war aims were ultimately repulsed on the battlefield, and not at the negotiating table. Yet the [UN] Secretariat had convinced itself early on that broader use of force by the international community was beyond our mandate and anyway undesirable. In a report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali] spoke against a ‘culture of death’, arguing that peace should be pursued only through non-military methods. When, in June 1995, the international community provided UNPROFOR with a heavily armed rapid reaction force, we argued against using it robustly to implement our mandate. We decisive action was finally taken by UNPROFOR in August and September 1995, it helped to bring the war to a conclusion.

Kofi Annan (1999)
干预失败

干预失败的论争可能被重新表述为两套不同观点的冲突：干预悲观主义与干预乐观主义。基本上，干预悲观主义认为，未得到主要当事方的同意和合作，就很难对人道主义灾难采取行动；如果维和部队跨越了同意的鸿沟，一切都将失去希望。而干预乐观主义则认为，国际社会可以强迫重建失败国家和改造凶恶国家；在必要时诱导共识才能实现成功。这两个矛盾观点的对峙在两场最失败的战后人道主义干预行动中得到了生动体现：索马里和卢旺达。干预乐观主义促使联合国发起了一个豪言壮语的行动，旨在武装解除索马里和重建政府。而干预悲观主义促使联合国对卢旺达的种族灭绝视而不见。正如我们将看到的，联合国本可以在索马里做得更少，而在卢旺达本可以做得更多。

索马里（1992–1995）

索马里的危机是内战和饥荒的共同作用。在1991年中期，索马里陷入了第二次内战，直接导致了数以万计平民的死亡。更糟糕的是，1992年索马里爆发了灾难性的饥荒。战争和普遍的无政府状态使西方援助机构在索马里进行援助工作变得非常危险和困难。1992年中期部署550名巴基斯坦维和人员的联合国索马里行动（UNOSOM I）并未带来显著改善。UNOSOM I在得到索马里主要战犯同意的情况下运作。然而，由于援助是份量决定的，战犯们并不准备让援助自由流动。

在联合国秘书长布特罗斯·布特罗斯-加利（Boutros Boutros-Ghali）和美国援助机构的压力下，美国领导了37,000人的联合特遣队（UNITAF）在1992年12月早些时候进入索马里（包括28,000名美国士兵）。依据联合国安理会第794号决议，UNITAF被授权‘使用必要的手段，尽快在索马里建立安全的人道主义援助环境’。UNITAF实现了这一目标，将自己定位为创建援助区域的去军事化地带（而非更激进的目标是武装解除战斗派系）。然后它利用压倒性的军事优势将其势力范围内的武装团体吓退。按照自己的标准，UNITAF是成功的；援助得以送达饥饿的人们，饥荒消失。

UNITAF在1993年中期将权力移交给了一支28,000人的新联合国部队UNOSOM II。UNOSOM II有更雄心勃勃的目标；不仅要在索马里战场上武力解除战斗派系并帮助重建国家（UNSC Resolution 814），而且要让联合国秘书长所希望的全面解除武装成为可能以实现长期安全。新上台的克林顿政府对多国维和力量抱有乐观态度，愿意扩大行动以防止在卢旺达发生的种族灭绝。

UNITAF将权力移交给一支28,000人的新更强的联合国部队UNOSOM II，于1993年中期。UNOSOM II拥有更雄心勃勃的使命；它不仅要武力解除战斗派系，而且要在索马里战场上帮助重建国家（UNSC Resolution 814）。布特罗斯-加利希望看到全面解除武装以在索马里生产长期安全。新上台的克林顿政府对多国维和力量抱有乐观态度，愿意扩大行动以防止在卢旺达发生的种族灭绝。
the UN’s role in Somalia. However, the new mandate placed the United Nations on a collision course with the Somali warlords. In June 1993, one Somali faction ambushed a UN patrol, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. The UN responded by effectively declaring war on the warlord responsible, General Aideed: UNOSOM II was mandated to ‘take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the attacks’ (UNSC Resolution 837). It was a war the UN would lose. UNOSOM II spent the Summer in pitched battles with Somali gunmen, while an elite US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) buzzed around the Somalia capital (Mogadishu) in helicopters, hunting for Aideed. Any goodwill on the part of the general Somali populace towards the UN melted away as US helicopter gunships blew up buildings. The mission ended in disaster, when the QRF was ambushed on October 3 during a mission intended to capture top Aideed officials. US helicopters were shot out of the sky, and in the intense fire-fight that followed 18 US soldiers were killed, 78 were injured, and one was captured. That effectively ended the American involvement in Somalia; within months, US forces had pulled out. UNOSOM II dragged on until 1995, but without much UN heart and US backing, it achieved little.

Somalia is the ‘Vietnam’ of peacekeeping. Despite pouring money (US$1.6 billion), material, and personnel into Somalia, the United Nations failed to restore long-term order and to rebuild the state. UNOSOM II tried to do too much with too little: it lacked the command capabilities and combat power of UNITAF, yet it was tasked to do something UNITAF had deliberately avoided: disarming the warlords. In the wake of the dramatic collapse of UNOSOM II, the modest achievements of UNITAF were forgotten.

Rwanda (1993–94)

Over about 100 days, between April and July 1994, 800,000 people were massacred in Rwanda. This humanitarian crisis was caused by a power struggle between Hutu extremists and Hutu and Tutsi moderates, which broke out when the Hutu-dominated regime of President Habyarimana bowed in the early 1990s to domestic and international pressure for the introduction of multi-party democracy. The regime sought to increase its base of support by bringing extremist Hutu opposition parties into a transitional government. This occurred in the context of simultaneous military and economic pressure on the government, respectively brought by invasion from neighbouring Uganda by the Tutsi army of Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), and a dramatic fall in export revenues combined with severe drought. Once in government, Hutu extremists used their monopoly of mass media to incite attacks against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and to organize militias to carry out small-scale massacres. In reprisal, the RPF army launched an attack on the capital Kigali in 1993 that was only repulsed with French military support. After such a close call, Habyarimana was forced to sign a peace deal with the RPF that led to Tutsi inclusion in the government and the exclusion of Hutu extremists. This was the trigger for genocide in Rwanda. In order to retain power and avoid judicial accountability for complicity in attacks on Tutsi civilians, Hutu extremists got rid of the President (shooting down his plane on 6 April) and began a systematic campaign of mass slaughter designed to eliminate all opponents and incriminate the entire Hutu population in the process.

There was a UN peacekeeping force on the ground when the genocide started in early April; the 2,500 strong United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
UNAMIR had been deployed with a very limited mandate (UNSC Resolution 872) to monitor the ceasefire between the government and RPF, and to assist in relief operations. Under-staffed, under-resourced, and unauthorized to use force to prevent war crimes, UNAMIR was completely overwhelmed by the horror that unfolded around it. Amidst the massacres, French, Belgian, and Italian troops arrived in force to evacuate Europeans but did not stay to save Rwandese. To make matters worse, the Belgian and Bangladeshi contingents of UNAMIR were withdrawn by their national governments (in Belgian’s case, after 10 Belgian soldiers were brutally murdered by Hutu extremists). The RPF retaliated by resuming its offensive against the Hutu authorities. The United Nations responded on 21 April by reducing UNAMIR to 270 personnel, and focusing its efforts on re-establishing the ceasefire. It was not until 17 May that the UNSC adopted Resolution 918, expanding UNAMIR to 5,500 and authorizing it to protect the populace. However, UN member states were not forthcoming with these forces and, one month later, UNAMIR was still only 500 strong. Eventually, the genocide ran out of steam. The RPF managed to save some civilians by sweeping westwards across the country and pushing back Hutu extremists. On 9 July, the French deployed a force of 2,300 troops ostensibly to create a Humanitarian Protection Zone in the western corner of Rwanda, but in reality to protect their retreating Hutu allies who eventually fled across the border to (what was then) Zaire.

The previous UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, acknowledged the UN’s failure in Rwanda. It has been argued that the United Nations could have stopped the genocide in its tracks by rapidly deploying a modest force of 5,000. The counter-argument to this is that the pace of genocide was such that the world had no hope of responding in time. Only the United States had the capability to rapidly deploy an intervention force. However, it would have taken at least four weeks for the Clinton administration to realize the scale of massacre and send in even a small force. By May, the genocide was practically over (Juperman 2000). However, the international community could have beefed UNAMIR prior to the genocide. UNAMIR had reliable intelligence forewarning the genocide. This was communicated to the United Nations in New Y ork by UNAMIR Force Commander, Major-General Roméo Dallaire. Furthermore, Dallaire repeatedly sent warnings in February of the worsening security situation. The United Nations could have done a lot more to halt the genocide. That is the finding of the Independent Inquiry set up by Secretary General Annan to investigate the UN response to the Rwanda crisis. In its report submitted to Annan in 1999, the Inquiry found ‘an overriding failure [by the United Nations] to create a force with the capacity, resources and mandate to deal with the growing violence and eventual genocide in Rwanda’. Its conclusion is inescapable: ‘The Security Council bears a responsibility for its lack of political will to do more to stop the killing’ (United Nations 1999).

The shadow of Somalia

Somalia is partly to blame for the failure of the UN intervention in Rwanda. It explains why Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and President Clinton started out intervention optimists but ended up intervention pessimists. The Secretary General’s first Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, was decidedly upbeat about the prospects for wider peacekeeping and calling on member states to provide more resources for such operations.
Significantly, it defined peacekeeping as ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, *hitherto* with the consent of all the parties concerned’ (United Nations 1992), implying that consent may not be required in future. Similarly, President Clinton entered office in 1993 seeking to expand America’s commitment to multilateral peace operations. This was reflected in drafts of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*. After disaster in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali and Clinton both changed tune. Boutros-Ghali’s 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* re-asserts the crucial importance of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force to operational success. Equally, the final version of PDD-25 released in May 1994 stated that ‘it is not US policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or US involvement in such operations’ (American Society of International Law 1994). The lack of political will identified by the Independent Inquiry on the UN Response to Rwanda, was all too evident in Boutros-Ghali’s failure to push the case for intervention, matched by US (and UK) obstruction in the Security Council of a rapid UN response.

**KEY POINTS**

- The debate between those who warn against crossing the consent divide and those who call for use of force to induce consent is essentially a debate between intervention pessimists and intervention optimists.
- The tension between intervention pessimists and intervention optimists was played out in the UN’s two greatest intervention failures: Somalia and Rwanda. The UN failed in Somalia by trying to do too much; it failed in Rwanda by not doing nearly enough.
- UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and US President Clinton started out as intervention optimists but turned into intervention pessimists following failure in Somalia. This resulting lack of political will prevented effective UN intervention in Rwanda.

### The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention

Politics gives meaning to humanitarian crises, defining those that demand international response. It selectively focuses international attention on human suffering and human rights abuses on certain places in space and time. Serbia’s brutal repression of Kosovo triggered Western humanitarian intervention; Russia’s brutal repression of Chechnya has not. Equally Iraqi attacks on Kurds in 1991 resulted in the creation of a Kurdish ‘Safe Haven’ in Iraq guarded by thousands of troops and Allied air power, while even more murderous Iraqi attacks on Kurds several years earlier met with no international response. Politics also shapes the form of humanitarian intervention: the speed and scale of international response. Politics operates at two levels, in particular, to define crises and shape responses: at the level of domestic public opinion, and the level of Security Council politics.
Public opinion

It is commonly believed by policy-makers and commentators alike that Western public opinion can make and break humanitarian interventions. Public opinion can prompt military intervention when the public responds to media images of massive suffering. Thus ‘extensive media coverage of emaciated Somalis ensured a suitable international outcry (the “Do Something” response)’ (von Hippel 2000: 59) and later in Bosnia, according to the US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, ‘the reason the West finally, belatedly intervened was heavily related to media coverage’ (Holbrooke 1999: 20). This is called ‘the CNN effect’: coined after the Cable News Network’s total televised coverage of the Gulf War. At the same time, public support for humanitarian interventions are assumed to be conditional on minimal peacekeeper casualties. This is ‘the body bags effect’: referring to the impact of returning body bags with American war dead on US public support for the Vietnam War. We may expect the public to be particularly sensitive to casualties in humanitarian interventions because these military actions are freely entered into by their government: in this sense, they are ‘wars of choice’, as opposed to ‘wars of necessity’ that must be fought to preserve national security. It is also widely believe that the body bags effect is heightened in the televised age, in that extensive media coverage of dead peacekeepers will lead to a collapse of public support for a mission. In this sense, it is argued that the CNN effect is a double-edged sword; the off-cited example is Somalia, with the collapse in US support following the deaths of 18 American soldiers (see Box 15.3).

As a concept, the CNN effect is quite misleading. It underestimates the extent to which governments can frame the media debate, and thereby choose the place and moment of intervention. Generally, governments will be least able to do this when they are uncertain as to the best policy to pursue (whether to intervene or not, and how), and when those lobbying for intervention are able to mobilize opposition politicians behind their cause. Disunity within the politician establishment, be it within the executive or across the executive–legislative divide, not only reduces the executive’s ability to influence the media debate, it also makes the public more responsible to media calls for intervention.

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**BOX 15.3**

**The CNN Effect as a Double-edged Sword**

The fact that the USA pulled the plug on its Somali intervention after the loss of 18 US Rangers in a fire-fight in October 1993 indicates how capricious public opinion is. Televised images of starving and dying Somalis had persuaded the outgoing Bush administration to launch a humanitarian rescue mission, but once the US public saw the consequences of this in terms of dead Americans being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the Clinton administration was forced to announced a timetable for the withdrawal of all US forces from Somalia. What this case demonstrates is that the ‘CNN factor’ is a double-edged sword: it can pressu- rize governments into humanitarian intervention, yet with equal rapidity, pictures of casualties arriving home can lead to public disillusionment and calls for withdrawal.

*Wheeler and Bellamy (2005: 564–5)*
In the case of Somalia, the CNN effect did operate because the Bush Administration was uncertain as to what to do, and there was a powerful pro-intervention coalition comprised of US aid agencies and sympathetic members of Congress. In the case of Kosovo in 1999, the Clinton administration was able to resist media pressure for a US-led ground force intervention to stop Serbian atrocities against ethnic Albanians. The administration was certain that it did not want to adopt such a policy, and opposition politicians in Congress were also against a ground intervention.

The body bags effect is similarly misleading. Empirical evidence from opinion polling suggests that peacekeeper casualties do not necessarily result in public calls for an immediate withdrawal. In the case of Somalia, most Americans favoured increased US military involvement following the killing of US soldiers. The polls also show that American public support was primarily conditional on evidence of Somali public support for US involvement in the UN mission, and much less so on US casualties. If ordinary Somalis wanted US troops to go home, then ordinary Americans saw little reason for their soldiers to stick around. If Somalis appreciated what US forces were doing on their behalf, then most Americans were prepared to support the intervention even if there were US fatalities. America pulled out of UNOSOM II following the deaths of its soldiers because of an anticipated (rather than actual) collapse of US public support. US policy-makers expected that their public would demand an immediate US withdrawal and acted to head off this public reaction. What the Somali case does reveal is the importance of domestic political unity in sustaining public support interventions. Doubts were expressed in Congress about US involvement in Somali in the summer of 1993 when UNOSOM II drifted into war against Aideed, and this resulted in a drop in public support for the mission; public support actually rallied in the short term following US casualties.

Rather than focusing on public sensitivity to casualties it might be more analytically useful to think in terms of political sensitivity to casualties. Governments will be sensitive to casualties when there is policy uncertainty and political disunity, which, in turn, will have already eroded public support for missions. There is also reason to believe that political sensitivity may vary greatly from country to country. Just as the loss of 18 US soldiers ended America’s involvement in Somalia so the deaths of 10 Belgian troops caused Belgian to pulled out of Rwanda. However, Pakistan did not withdraw its contingent from UNOSOM II when it lost 24 soldiers, nor was Britain’s commitment to its intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 shaken by battle-casualties. This may have something to do with the political structure of countries, with some more likely to encourage and enable political disunity (e.g., sharing of powers and executive–legislative divide in the United States) than others (e.g., executive dominance of Parliament in Britain). Obviously, political sensitivity has operational implications, which are discussed in the next section.

**Security Council politics**

The 15 members of the Security Council have the responsibility for authorizing humanitarian interventions. A majority of nine UNSC members are needed to take such a
decision. However, real power resides with the P5, and their individual right of veto. As we saw, conflict between the P5 during the cold war made the UNSC moribund as an instrument for managing international security. With the cold war over, cooperation between the P5 has greatly improved, but four political problems still dog UNSC sponsorship of humanitarian interventions.

Even after the cold war, the P5 remain states with great power interests and aspirations. Where a particular humanitarian crisis is associated with a certain P5 member (or members), others may withhold their support or even threaten to veto unless support is promised in exchange for their interests elsewhere in the world. This is the ‘log-rolling’ problem. Thus, Russia and later China obstructed UNSC Resolutions on peace operations in Haiti. Russia wanted UN endorsement of its own intervention in Georgia in 1994, while China was seeking a public apology from Haiti for inviting Taiwan’s Vice-President to the inauguration of Haiti’s new President in 1996. Sometimes, great power differences can produce a veto problem, when one P5 member refuses to contemplate a UN intervention which it considers threatening to its interests and/or aspirations. This was evident in Russia’s approach to Kosovo in the late 1990s: Russia refused to recognize the humanitarian dimensions of the evolving crisis and was clearly prepared to veto a UN intervention. This veto problem was solved by independent action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which argued that force was justified (even in the absence of UNSC resolution) on the grounds of ‘overwhelming humanitarian necessity’.

Even when the P5 all agree to authorize the deployment of a UN peace operations force, two problems can still hinder effective UN intervention. The first is the P5 tendency to ‘talk the talk’ but not ‘walk the walk’. The great powers acting through the UNSC often pass grand-sounding resolutions which they fail to back up with force. This is the ‘posturing’ problem. The creation of ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia is a classic example; these areas were not at all safe, because the UNSC was not prepared to deploy additional military forces to protect them (see Box 15.2). In this case, several UNSC members as well as the UN Secretariat warned at the time that ‘without the provision of any credible military threat’ these safe areas were meaningless, but the great powers went ahead regardless and set up defenceless ‘safe areas’.

Second, even when some of the P5 are prepared to ‘walk the walk’, they may totally disagree on which direction to take. Great powers may disagree on the nature of the humanitarian crisis as well as the most effective response. This is the coordination problem, which again was evident in Bosnia. The United States and its European allies had completely different perceptions of the Bosnian conflict which led them to disagree fundamentally on the appropriate response. The European powers saw an ethnic conflict, the solution to which was some form of partition. However, the United States saw it as a war started by Serbia and consequently were unprepared to support partition because this would reward Serbian aggression. It was only when this coordination problem was resolved in 1995, by the United States accepting that partition was a necessary evil, that the international community were able to take effective action to end the Bosnian war. Militarily speaking, all these political problems have adverse operational implications. It is to this that we now turn.
The Military Character of Peace Operations

In order to stop conflict, peace forces must be prepared to engage in combat (not in the least to deal with peace spoilers). Such military forces have been designed, equipped, and trained according to fundamental principles of war. However, these principles rarely apply in practice when it comes to peace operations. In addition, there are a number of specific operational pathologies created by political imperatives to manage public support for peace operations. In addition, there is a number of specific operational pathologies created by political imperatives to manage public support for peace operations.

Principles and practicalities

If we look at the four main principles of war—objective, unity, mass, and surprise—we can see that all are problematic when it comes to peace operations. First and foremost is the principle that military operations should be conducted towards clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives. This is possible in war, with objectives including seizure of territory and/or destruction of enemy forces. However, in peace operations, objectives are often poorly defined and indecisive, if not unattainable. Objectives for peace operations are usually established by UNSC mandate; for non-UN interventions, mission mandates are set by the contributing national governments. Security Council politics often prevent the construction of a clear mission mandate. Mandates may be deliberately vague in order to get over the coordinating problem. Imprecise mandates also may emerge as a consequence of the posturing problem; as we saw with the safe areas in Bosnia, UNSC members may want to talk tough without actually committing themselves to tough action. Peace operations are, in themselves, decisive only in the sense of short-term effects; for example, securing aid routes or stopping a massacre. Truly decisive objectives are the long-term provision...
of societal security, political surety, and economic stability, for which non-military instruments are essential. Unattainable objectives also flow from the posturing problem in the UNSC, which results in grand-sounding mandates being given to under-resourced missions; again the safe areas mandate given to UNPROFOR is a stark example of this. To be sure, military commanders will attempt to translate the mandates they are given into clear and attainable mission objectives. Thus, UNITAF sought to create a secure environment for aid operations by keeping armed bandits at bay rather than disarming them. Equally, UNPROFOR protected humanitarian aid by escorting aid convoys rather than securing aid routes; the latter would have involved using force to clear Serb and Croatian roadblocks, while the former did not. In effect, objectives are rendered clear and attainable by minimizing the mission. Ironically, this makes objectives less decisive: the secure environment in Somalia did not outlive UNITAF, and aid flows in Bosnia depended on the goodwill of the belligerent parties and not on UNPROFOR’s power.

Unity of effort, the second principle, is achieved in war through unity of command; that is, having all forces under one commander. Thus, the coalition forces that liberated France in 1944 were led by a single commander (General Dwight Eisenhower) as were those that liberated Kuwait in 1991 (General Norman Schwartzkopf). Unity of command is less assured in peace operations for two reasons. First, peace forces are often drawn from a wider variety of troop-contributing states than in normal coalition warfare. Differences in military culture, lack of prior joint operational experience, and potential political rivalries between contributing states, all inhibit the creation and operation of an effective command structure in peace operations. Sometimes these differences can be so great as to render the chain of command inoperative, as was witnessed in late 2000 by the bitter dispute between the Indian commander and Nigerian and Zambian contingents in the UN force in Sierra Leone. Second, the governments of troop-contributing countries are reluctant to let the UN do as it will with their troops. Thus, national governments frequently bypass the mission command structure and issue instructions directly to their forces in the field. Western powers have also on occasion provided combat forces to support UN missions without actually placing those forces under UN command; the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia, the US QRF in Somalia, and British military forces in Sierra Leone all remained under national political and military command. To make matters worse, unity of command is not sufficient in peace operations. Commanders must coordinate their actions with civilian agencies—UN, non-government, and local aid agencies—to achieve unity of effort in peace operations. Here differences in military and civilian organizational cultures are even more pronounced and can place a profound barrier to effective and timely coordination. In Somalia, civil–military cooperation under UNITAF broke down when the military way of doing things—controlling movement and information—inflamed aid agencies that were used to operating independently of such restrictions.

The third principle is for commanders to mass force. This may be achieved through concentration of force at points in space and time that will have greatest impact on the enemy. It may also be achieved through massing the effects of combat power, that is, synchronized use of all the elements of combat power to create decisive effect. However, when it comes to peace operations, forces are more commonly dispersed rather than concentrated in order to maintain high visibility and provide security on the ground. In areas of Somalia, US Marines were parcelled out to villages in the smallest of units, rifle squads.
Force dispersal at this level also limits possibilities for massing effects. The smaller the unit, the fewer elements of combat power that will be available to the commander. The problems of under-resourcing and disunity of command that are endemic in peace operations also greatly reduce possibilities for massing force. As Somalia showed, massing force may prove difficult even for the purposes of providing emergency fire support to a unit in trouble; UNOSOM II had trouble pulling together the force of Malaysian and Pakistani tanks and armoured cars that finally bailed out the US QRF from Aideed’s ambush.

Last is the principle of surprise, namely, to strike the enemy when and where they least expect it. The critical ingredients for surprise are speed, secrecy, and deception. Speed refers to observing and shaping developments in the area of operations. The unity of command problem in peace operations reduces the ability of peace forces to do this in a timely manner. Equally, secrecy is often compromised by the imperative for unity of effort, which requires peace forces to share operational information with civilian agencies (many of which hire local staff). Thus, Aideed had excellent intelligence about UNOSOM II operations because some of the locally hired aid workers were his spies. Deception is problematic in urban environments, and particularly so in peace operations because the local populace may also act as eyes and ears for belligerent parties.

**Public opinion and operational pathologies**

In place of traditional principles of war, peace operations are shaped by the political imperative to manage public opinion. As we have seen, this imperative is generated by political sensitivity to casualties, particularly in what are essentially wars of choice. At the level of national policy, this results in a focus on winning the media battle (see Box 15.4). This was clearly illustrated in Kosovo, with NATO launching an elaborate public relations campaign directed at countering Serbia’s attempt to portray itself as the victim of NATO aggression.

Political concerns with public opinion produce three pathologies in peace operations. First is the strategic compression of the battlefield. In conventional war, strategic outcomes are shaped by military action at the campaign level: such as the British campaign to drive the Argentinean military off the Falklands or allied campaign in 1990–91 to push the Iraqi

**BOX 15.4**

**Winning the Media Battle**

In the propaganda war, the deadlines are set by television schedules and first editions as much as by enemy movements and diplomatic engagements. Surprise attack means preemption by an enemy press release, reinforced by visits to bomb sites or captured territory by reporters allowed to stay in the enemy capital precisely for this purpose. A poor defence means getting caught by unexplained discrepancies and self-contradictions. The credibility of the commander is determined in the television studio as much as on the battlefield. It is no good being able to motivate servicemen and women to accept the hazards of combat if you cannot motivate an otherwise non-participating public to back them in opinion polls.

*Freedman (2000: 340)*
Army out of Kuwait. By contrast, tactical military actions can have strategic consequences in peace operations.\(^3\) The loss of 18 US soldiers in a single fire-fight caused the Somalia mission to collapse. Similarly, the allied bombing of the Chinese embassy shook NATO’s strategy in Kosovo. As a consequence, not only must military commanders become effective media managers, they must also anticipate and avoid those military actions likely to result in political fallout.

Second is an operational focus on full force protection, that is, with ensuring the peace forces are not vulnerable to attack. This is peculiarly American obsession that flows from an acute political sensitivity to casualties. Full force protection, as an operational imperative, can hinder effective peace operations in a number of ways. It can result in the concentration of force when security for aid operations would be best promoted through the dispersal of peace forces to provide military presence over a larger area. It can require military commanders to order their forces to wear body armour, visibly demonstrating distrust and insecurity (as US forces did in Somalia), when a more relaxed force posture would make it easier to build relations with the local communities (as British forces did in Sierra Leone). American military opinion appears divided on this issue. Senior officers with memories of Vietnam share the casualty aversion of political leaders, while more junior officers with recent experience of peace operations realize that full force protection can be a serious impediment to mission success.

Third is an over-reliance on air power (see Box 15.5). As the 1990–91 Gulf War demonstrated, air power is most effective when employed in synergy with land power: the allied air campaign destroyed the Iraqi military infrastructure and softened up Iraqi land defences, while the land campaign (with air support) smashed the Iraqi army in Kuwait. However, given the aversion to casualties in wars of choice, the Western powers are deeply reluctant to commit ground forces to combat in support of peace operations. In other words, they believe that the best way to achieve full force protection is to ensure that the only forces deployed are in high-flying fast jets. Sometimes Western air power can be combined with local land power to achieve mission success. Thus, the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb bases in 1995 combined with Croatia’s successful land offensive against Serb territory in eastern Bosnia forced the Bosnia Serbs to sue for peace.

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**BOX 15.5**

**Fatal Attraction: America and Air Power**

Use of air power can help sustain domestic support or coalition unity [by reducing the risks of own casualties and collateral damage], but it cannot eliminate underlying political constraints. In Eliot Cohen’s words, ‘Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment’. This view poses a challenge for air power. Because policymakers often see air power strikes as a low-risk, low-commitment measure, air power will be called on when U.S. public or allied commitment is weak—a situation that will make successful coercion far harder when casualties do occur or when air strikes fail to break adversary resistance. Air power, like other military instruments, cannot overcome a complete lack of political will.

Byman and Waxman (2000: 38)
Four years later, NATO again replied on air power to force Serbs to stop committing atrocities, this time in Kosovo. The Clinton Administration went so far as to publicly rule out a ground intervention in Kosovo (so as to quell Congressional fears). This gave Serb forces a free hand to terrorize the Albanian populace and drive them out of the province. Unlike the Croatian Army in Bosnia, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was unable to generate sufficient combat power to act as an effective surrogate ground force for NATO. Accordingly, the Serbs were able to weather NATO bombing for 78 days before finally capitulating. Significantly, Serbian surrender followed NATO finally making a credible threat of a land invasion. Equally significantly, by this stage Kosovo had been emptied of Albanians.

These operational pathologies are not in evidence in coalition military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The initial US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are not examples of humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian outcomes were predicted as by-products of these operations by US policy-makers. Both campaigns were primarily about protecting national security of the United States and its coalition partners and, as such, were portrayed as ‘wars of necessity’ by coalition leaders. The ongoing post-conflict stabilization operations in both countries, led by the US in Iraq and NATO in Afghanistan, have something of the character of peace operations. Coalition forces have taken considerable casualties in both operations—as for early 2009, the United States had suffered over 3400 killed in action (KIA) in Iraq and over 400 KIAs in Afghanistan. Losses on this scale resulted in a marked decline in US public support for operations in Iraq from 2004 to 2006 (Afghanistan, which is overshadowed by Iraq, received little public attention during this period). Even so, the campaign in Iraq did not collapse. Instead, the United States surged an extra 30,000 troops in 2007. Force protection concerns did inform US strategy in 2006 when US forces conducted armoured patrols from large bases on the outskirts of Iraq cities, but in 2007 there was also complete overhaul in strategy and US forces were parcelled into ‘security stations’, manned 24/7, in the middle of Iraqi communities. Moreover, given the large coalition ground presence in both countries, can it be said that either campaign has over-relied on air power? However, it is likely that national security concerns and sunken political costs are bolstering both campaigns and suppressing operational pathologies. In short, Iraq and Afghanistan do not demonstrate an end of operational pathologies in peace operations. Indeed, the mounting costs and political fallout from Iraq may yet serve to reinforce these pathologies in future missions that are properly humanitarian and entirely wars of choice.

**KEY POINTS**

- In practice, peace operations often breach four of the main principles of war—objective, unity, mass, and surprise.
- The political imperative to manage public support for peace operations can create a number of operational pathologies, specifically, command complications caused by the strategic compression of the battlefield, sacrificing mission success to full force protection, and an over-reliance on air power.
Conclusion: Problems and Prospects

This chapter has dwelt on the problems of humanitarian intervention and peace operations. As we have seen, peace forces must avoid overuse of force so as to maintain consent for their operations while at the same time being prepared to take robust action against peace spoilers. Such careful balancing has dramatically failed in past interventions because the UN tried to do too much (Somalia) or too little (Rwanda). Moreover, contrary to popular belief, Western policy-makers can resist public pressure to intervene and are much more sensitive than public opinion to casualties in their own force. Finally, peace operations breach many of the principles of war and instead are shaped by adverse political imperatives.

As we saw, failure in Somalia had disastrous consequences for Rwanda. More generally, it triggered a return to intervention pessimism. Within the United Nations there were calls for the organization to return to traditional peace keeping. This ‘back to basics’ agenda has persisted in new UN doctrine on peace operations. UN Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (1995) emphasize, much as did the British Army in Wider Peacekeeping, the stark divide between consent based and coercive peace operations. Moreover, the UN Peacekeeping Training Manual (1997) is based on Nordic peacekeeping doctrine and so restricts use of force to self-defence only. However, at the political level, we have seen a return to intervention optimism. Leading this development was Secretary General Annan, who has argued that the UN must ‘reconsider some of the most basic [peacekeeping] assumptions about neutrality, the good faith of the parties, and the non-use of force’ (Independent 2000). Annan also declared in May 2000 that UN peace forces had to be capable of ‘countering and isolating those who go against agreed peace processes or commit violations’; in other words, capable of dealing with peace spoilers. Lead states also have a vital role to play in supporting UN efforts in this regard. Thus, the collapse of the UN operation in Sierra Leone was prevented by robust British military intervention. Sierra Leone also showed dramatically how coercion can work where consent had failed.

Supporting this new intervention optimism are more permissive norms of humanitarian intervention. Previously, the sovereignty norm codified in the UN Charter has operated to prevent intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. At the same time, as noted earlier, Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits the UN to use force to uphold ‘international peace and security’. Traditionally, Chapter VII was applied exclusively to interstate war. However, over the past decade, the UNSC has recognized that internal conflicts of the kind witnessed in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda can threatened international peace and security by spilling (refugees and combatants) over into neighbouring states, and so provide grounds for intervention. Furthermore, in 2000 the UNSC passed resolution 1296, establishing that ‘the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations affected by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security and thus be triggers for Security Council action’ (United Nations 2000). NATO’s intervention in Kosovo suggests that states may practice these new norms of humanitarian intervention even when so doing contradicts legal procedure: NATO’s war against Serbia was not authorized by the UNSC as required under the
UN Charter (although NATO member states argued that they were acting to uphold humanitarian law). Also relevant here is the development of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes. The International Criminal Court, following on from the Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, will hold state leaders and officials accountable for breaches of humanitarian law. Sovereignty will no longer be a licence for states to brutalize their own populations. This will further erode the sovereignty norm in favour of norms of humanitarian intervention.

All the same, this renewed will to act is still not matched by UN capacity. The United Nations remains woefully under-resourced for peace operations. The United States still owes the UN well over a billion dollars, mostly in peacekeeping arrears which it is unlikely to pay for some time yet. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in particular, is under-resourced and understaffed. This has been a long-term problem. For example, in 2000 it had 15 political desk officers running 14 missions, and 32 military officers providing operational support to 27,000 troops in the field. These DPKO staff are so overwhelmed by routine headquarters-related tasks in New York that they are unable to provide adequate support to missions in the field. UN missions are also complicated by the need to coordinate the operations of several departments (including DPKO, Department of Political Affairs and Department of Disarmament Affairs) and agencies (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and United Nations Development Program). The UN's bureaucratic procedures make matter worse by making it overly laborious to equip field missions.

These limitations in the UN’s capacity has resulted in some regionalization of peace operations. Thus, NATO deployed massive peace forces in Bosnia and Kosovo on behalf of the United Nations. The United States has encouraged African states, in particular, to develop a regional capacity for peace operations. This is an area where there is a high demand for peace forces, which (after Somalia) the United States is not at all keen to fill. Regional coalitions are supposed to enjoy several advantages over UN operations, namely, greater force cohesion, better local knowledge, greater commitment to the mission, and more suitable force structure. However, these advantages were not evident in the case of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) which attempted to restore order to the failed Liberian state from 1990–96. ECOMOG was divided by subregional rivalries between Francophone and Anglophone west African contributing states, it exhibited poor understanding and judgement of the political scene in Liberia, mission commitment was only maintained through the use of local surrogate forces (who had an interest in continuing the conflict), and it lacked the equipment, training, and logistical support for counter-insurgency operations. In short, regionalization of peace operations is not going to solve the UN’s problems.

These problems aside, the United Nations remains very much in the peace operations business. Three new peace operations missions were established in 2004 alone (in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, and Haiti). By 2005 the United Nations had over 68,000 troops serving in 18 missions around the world, and annual peace operations budget in excess of US$3.5 billion. The United Nations is also attempting to improve its institutional capacity for peace operations. Following on from the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (August 2000), the DPKO has been given extra staff and sharpened its mission
planning practices, and the United Nations has strengthened its logistical capacities (especially in terms of strategic stockpiling and sealift). Training has also been improved for peace forces from developing states. Finally, the UNSC passed UNSC Resolution 1327 in November 2000, in which it vowed to give future peace missions clear and achievable mandates, and ‘deterrent credibility’ where necessary. These are encouraging developments, but UN action falls far short of Annan’s aspirations. For two years (2003–2004), the UN dithered over intervention in the Sudanese region of Darfur, where government-sponsored atrocities were being committed against the local populace. Finally, in March 2005, the United Nations resolved to send in a 10,000 strong peace operations force. Lacking much combat capability, and only mandated to ‘assist’ the Sudanese government and the rebels implement a peace agreement, this peace force has been largely ineffective in preventing continuing atrocities in Darfur. In short, there may be renewed optimism about intervention in the United Nations, but Sudan shows that the international community still lacks the political will, and the United Nations lacks the material resources, to always act when and where action is needed.

1. Why was humanitarian intervention rare during the cold war?
2. How does ‘wider peacekeeping’ differ from traditional peacekeeping?
3. What is the ‘consent divide’ and when should it be crossed?
4. What are the lessons of Bosnia for dealing with peace spoilers?
5. Why is Somalia the ‘Vietnam’ of peacekeeping?
6. Could the UN have done more to stop genocide in Rwanda?
7. To what extent can public opinion ‘make and break’ humanitarian interventions?
8. What four problems hinder effective action by the UNSC in response to humanitarian crises?
9. How well do the principles of war apply to peace operations?
10. What operational pathologies are created by the imperative to manage public support for peace operations?
11. What are the signs of a return to intervention optimism?
12. Is some regionalization of peace operations to be welcomed?

FURTHER READING


*International Peacekeeping*. This journal is essential reading for scholars and students of peace operations.


S. J. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, *International Security* 22/2 (Fall 1997). Stedman coined the term ‘peace spoilers’ in this article, which usefully provides a typological theory for identifying and managing spoilers.


N. J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’ in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). This chapter examines the arguments for and against humanitarian intervention, focusing on the tensions between considerations of power, order, and justice in world politics.


United Nations Blue Book Series (New York: United Nations). Has books on Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia and Rwanda, each one offering a collection of key primary source materials and a lengthy commentary by the Secretary General.

WEB LINKS


- United States Institute of Peace Library http://www.usip.org/library/topics/peacekeeping.html This is the comprehensive ‘Peacekeeping Web Links’ page.

- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty http://www.iciss.ca/ The commission’s two-volume report, offering comprehensive analysis of the ethical, political, and military implications of humanitarian intervention, as well as case study analysis of past interventions, may be downloaded from this site.

- Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution http://fletcher.tufts.edu/chrcr/human.html This site offers useful academic perspectives on these issues.
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